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‘MAKE SCANDINAVIA A BULWARK
AGAINST FASCISM!’
Hitler’s seizure of power and the transnational
anti-fascist movement in the Nordic countries
Kasper Braskén
On a global scale, Hitler’s seizure of power on 30 January 1933 provided urgent
impetus for transnational anti-fascist conferences and rallies. One of the first Eur-
opean, but almost completely overlooked major conferences was organised in
Copenhagen in mid-April 1933 in the form of a Scandinavian Anti-Fascist Con-
ference. This formed a transnational meeting point of European and especially
Scandinavian workers and intellectuals that provided an important first response to
developments in Germany. The chapter will use the Scandinavian conference as a
prism to look back at anti-fascist activism in the Nordic countries during the
preceding years, and to then follow its transformation after 1933. It will contribute
to the global analysis of the transition period of communist-led anti-fascism from
the sectarian class-against-class line to the inception of the popular front period
in 1935.
What were these largely overlooked, first anti-fascist articulations in Europe, and
how were they connected to the rising transnational and global anti-fascist mobi-
lisation coordinated in Paris and London? As we shall see, on the one hand Hitler’s
seizure of power vitalised anti-fascism in Scandinavia but paradoxically, on the
other, it further sharpened the communist critique of reformist social democracy
and empowered social democratic anti-communism.
The Nazi seizure of power was not without its effects in the Nordic coun-
tries. It revealed several core dilemmas that most nations in the world were
facing: to continue with, and develop foreign relations and trade irrespective of
the new government, or be openly critical of internal German developments,
perhaps even boycott Hitler’s new regime. What space was there for anti-fascist
activity in 1933 and what kind of restrictions and limitations did Nordic gov-
ernments under pressure from the German foreign office impose on fighting
fascism?
Between neutrality, appeasement and collaboration
Scandinavia might seem like an ideal location for anti-fascist exile. Fascist parties
and movements in Denmark, Sweden and Norway remained extremely weak
during the interwar period. No far-right party received more than two per cent of
the electoral vote. Thanks to governmental crisis agreements that resulted in the
formation of alliances between the social democrats and the peasants’ parties in
Denmark (1933), Sweden (1933), Norway (1935), Finland (1937) and Iceland
(1937), Scandinavia remained ‘free from fascism’. Finland was, for a moment, the
exception as it headed towards serious political turmoil spearheaded by the far-right
Lapua movement during the early 1930s. Although banned after a poorly staged
coup attempt in February 1932, its leaders and many followers re-grouped in the
fascist Patriotic People’s Movement (Isänmaallinen Kansanliike, IKL).1 Despite fail-
ures to form major political parties or membership organisations, fascism’s indirect
influences were significant. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden for example, the
large conservative youth movements readily admired Hitler and were ready to
implement Nazi ideology in their political programmes and propaganda.2
For sure, the social democratic turn from revolutionary socialism to wholesale
reformism and broad peoples’ parties played a significant role in isolating domestic
fascisms. The wide social base of the so-called People’s Home (folkhemmet), brought
parliamentary stability through majority worker-peasant alliances, carried by strong
populist rhetoric. This was especially so in Sweden and Norway. In this process,
social democrats willingly detached themselves from Marxism in order to establish
a stable centre-left alliance that was distinct from the left-alliances formed under
the Popular Fronts in France and Spain.3 The social democratic tactic in the
Nordic countries was thus to pacify rather than to directly challenge the far right.
As the major social democratic parties co-opted far-right tropes on the ‘people’ and
‘nation’ they argued that the far right would dissipate and wither away. Right-
wing social democrats in Sweden such as Rickard Lindström4 even described their
political goal using the uncanny descriptor ‘national socialism’, irrefutably under-
cutting the far right’s nationalist appeals and underlining how patriotic the social
democrats were. But the crucial difference was that the social democrats positioned
themselves as champions of a democratic society, fighting both fascist and com-
munist dictatorships, and did not view liberalism or parliamentary democracy as
anathema.5 Nonetheless, as this chapter shows, the process of partly co-opting fas-
cist themes resulted in a strong response from the far left that claimed that these
parties were willingly or inadvertently pushing Scandinavia towards fascism, what
we today might call ‘mainstreaming’ fascist ideas.
When analysing Nordic responses to Nazi Germany, it is important to keep the
relatively strong position of Nordic social democracy in mind. Nordic communist
parties were electorally small and always a part of the parliamentary opposition.
Anti-communism was common long before the emergence of anti-fascism and, for
example in Finland, the bitter and bloody civil war between the reds and the whites
in 1918, and the long common border with the Soviet Union, made anti-communism
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a pivotal part of majority political culture, largely accepted by the social democrats
as well as the far right. Finland was an ‘anti-communist democracy’.6 Even Finnish
left-socialists who were pushing for a stronger social democratic anti-fascist position
after 1933 were exposed to allegations by the social democratic party leadership of
being ‘communists’, or sympathetic with the Russian Bolsheviks. This resulted in
many being purged from the mother party.7
When the Nazis came to power, it quickly became apparent that the responsi-
bilities connected to holding governmental office were difficult to reconcile with
types of more militant anti-fascism as envisioned by the Social Democratic party’s
rank and file. This became acutely clear in the case of Denmark where the Social
Democratic Youth (DSU) developed a militant, anti-fascist strand of social
democracy. They were inspired by German and Austrian social democrats and
formed militant defence units in the DSU. In the end, the Danish Social Demo-
cratic party put the lid on their most militant and confrontational anti-fascist acti-
vists. As a rule all DSU members who participated in united front demonstrations
with the communists were threatened with exclusion.8 During the Scandinavian
anti-fascist conference in April 1933 the Danish communists acknowledged the
important role of the DSU. According to the Chair of the DSU, Ivan Solgaard, it
was apparent that there was a ‘great will to fight’ among the DSU members,
although tragically the Social Democratic leadership was pressing the DSU not to
engage in anti-fascism.9
When it came to it, the needs of governments overruled the needs of the social
democratic movement; i.e. good foreign relations with Germany trumped efforts to
form a strong anti-fascist position.10 As a small neighbouring country, the Danes
quickly succumbed to a path of appeasement in the name of neutrality. Germany
was Denmark’s second most important trade partner and the new German govern-
ment was showing signs of being extremely sensitive to Danish criticism. Tellingly,
on 1 March 1933, only one day after the cataclysmic German Reichstag fire,
Thorvald Stauning, the leader of Danish social democracy and Prime Minister dic-
tated a letter to H. P. Sørensen, the editor of the official organ of the Danish social
democrats Social-Demokraten. Stauning insisted that Social-Demokraten should desist
from attacking Hitler but blame the communists instead, because they had, accord-
ing to Stauning, split the labour movement, empowered Hitler, and were essentially
to blame for what was occurring now. The main attack was to be directed against
communists not the new Nazi regime.11 Social-Demokraten had initially strongly
condemned Nazi Germany. Stauning now used his power as head of state and party
leader to regulate its reporting. As a consequence, when reporting on events in
Germany, it now did so with caution.12 The German foreign office was also closely
monitoring international press reaction. The head of the German legation in Den-
mark, Baron von Richthofen, approached the Danish foreign minister Peter Munch
to protest against reports published in Denmark. On 2 March 1933, Munch urged
the Danish press to remain neutral and to show moderation when choosing their
headlines and caricatures. Moreover, they were instructed to desist from publishing
interviews with people in Germany or anti-Nazi refugees.
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Developments in Sweden followed a similar pattern. The Swedish social demo-
cratic foreign minister Rickard Sandler valued good trade relations with Germany
above all else. This was a form of ‘neutrality politics’ that advocated negotiation
with Germany. As the Swedish historian Klas Åmark notes, Sandler did not per-
ceive the situation after 1933 as a fight between ‘dictatorship or democracy’ but as
a more traditional conflict between the great powers, where also the small neutral
states had to find their place. At the same time Sandler criticised those in the social
democratic party who were possessed by a ‘crusade mentality’, meaning those
pursuing a critical anti-fascist policy. As in Denmark, Sandler invited the chief
editors of a number of Swedish newspapers to discuss what could be published
about the German Nazis and Hitler. The new regime was irritated about ‘pointed
formulations’ and satirical drawings, especially those published in the Swedish
newspaper Social-Demokraten.13 Even in Finland, Germans complained about the
hostile tendency of parts of its press. The Swedish speaking left-wing press in Fin-
land had been the most critical but the Finnish liberals (Edistyspuolue) and the social
democratic press were also hostile to the new German government.14
How should we understand the restrictions made by democratic governments on
the free press? The role of the press during the 1920s and 1930s – the golden age
of newspapers and print media – cannot be underrated. The media formed the
most significant platform for the formation of public opinion, and the censorship
was clearly intended to appease Nazi Germany; it was the first, partly self-inflicted
wound caused by neutrality.15 Here, it is equally important to remember that the
Nordic reactions were in no way unique. Most significantly, the actions of the
Soviet Union reveal that anti-fascism as a Soviet State policy was also undesired. As
Bernhard H. Bayerlein shows, the official Soviet position viewed the developments
in Germany not solely in a negative light: the destruction of the German Social
Democratic movement (i.e. the ‘social fascists’) was seen as an inherently positive
development despite the parallel breakdown of German communism. Moreover, it
was believed that Hitler’s coming to power increased the conflict between the
capitalist countries in the West, and therefore decreased the danger of an imperialist
war against the Soviet Union. Already in 1933, the USSR’s highest leadership
perceived Hitler’s domestic policy as an internal German development that the
Soviet Union had no business to meddle with. Good foreign relations and the
protection of mutual economic interests was more important, as the ratification of
the Soviet-German trade agreement on 5 May 1933 perfectly illustrates.16 If the
Soviet Union itself was pursuing a line of ‘neutrality’ or ‘non-intervention’, what
did it mean for transnational communist-led anti-fascism in the immediate post-1933
period?
Nordic communists and anti-fascism
Before further investigating the initiatives of 1933, we need to locate the longer
trajectories of Nordic anti-fascism. The Comintern’s sixth world congress in 1928
in Moscow had recommended that similar workers’ defence organisations as the
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German Red Front Fighters’ League were to be established by all communist par-
ties. The Swedish Red Front League (Röda Front Förbundet, RFF) was officially
founded at a first, largely unknown ‘Scandinavian antifascist conference’ that was
held in Stockholm in 1930. According to a Swedish governmental inquiry into the
communist movement, the RFF’s anti-fascism had arisen as a reaction to the radi-
calisation of the Finnish far-right Lapua movement. The goal of the RFF was to
unite all ‘real enemies of fascism, men and women’ into a nation-wide anti-fascist
fighting organisation. The official purpose of the RFF was to function as a workers’
guard against fascism. Although it is very difficult to assess the success of the anti-
fascist disturbances at Nazi meetings in Sweden, they should be historically
acknowledged. The far right was not left unchallenged, as also highlighted in
Helen Lööw’s pivotal work on the history of the Nazis in Sweden.17 The RFF had
a separate youth section called the Anti-Fascist Youth Guards (Anti-fascistiska unga
gardena, Antifa), which also closely collaborated with the Communist Youth Asso-
ciation (Kommunistiska Ungdoms Förbundet, KUF). According to the Stockholm
police, the KUF had around 12,000 registered members in 1933. The youth
Antifa was characterised in the government surveillance report as a reservoir for all
working-class youths who were not prepared to directly join the KUF, but
who wanted to be active in anti-fascist activities. Significantly, those involved in
Antifa work were urged to fight against both their own social democratic leadership
and the fascist menace.18
When the KUF organised a congress in 1931 in Stockholm its Central Com-
mittee member Nils Bengtsson urged all members of the KUF to visit the meetings
organised by the Swedish National Socialists and to obstruct them from winning
over any supporters. The methods to do this were, for example, singing or speak-
ing at full volume and loud interruptions during speeches. If Birger Furugård – the
leader of the Swedish National Socialist Party – was going to hold a public speech,
Bengtsson advised KUF activists to take all their comrades along and attend the
meeting. In a carefully organised and co-ordinated way they should form a circle
around the podium and once Furugård had started speaking they would start
singing, and irritate him and the crowd so that the speaker could not be heard. If
this was unsuccessful, Bengtsson instructed, they should not hesitate to take the
speaker by the collar. Bengtsson also warned the anti-fascists that the Nazis would
be most likely armed with truncheons and they should prepare for things to get
physical.19
In August 1932 a meeting near Copenhagen turned into a mass fight between
uniformed members of the DSU and uniformed Danish SA members.20 Later in
April 1933, a newly founded ‘Antifa-Committee’ in Vesterbro, Copenhagen,
described how, in its call for a powerful fighting front against fascism, comrades
were becoming victims of Nazi violence. On 6 April 1933, merely two weeks
before the Scandinavian Anti-Fascist Conference a ‘young DSU comrade’ who had
been on his way from a meeting was suddenly seen stumbling into the premises of
the Danish Communist Party in Vesterbro. When he entered the room, his entire
body was shaking and he was about to collapse, but before passing out he uttered:
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‘It was the damn Nazis (Det er de satans Nascister).’ The Antifa-Committee declared
the young comrade a victim of the raw and ruthless ‘Hitler murderbands’ in Den-
mark. May it serve as an eye-opener to all workers, the committee declared in its
bulletin, that in the current situation it is a necessity to form a strong united front
against the ‘fascist front of the upper classes’. Workers, working class women, social
democrats, communists, and unorganised workers were urged to draw the proper
conclusions from the attack: it showed what was waiting for them if they did not
activate themselves.21 Such confrontations were a vital part of the growing Scan-
dinavian conflict between anti-fascism and fascism, and highlights the importance
of analysing Nordic anti-fascism not only as a response to an external threat, but
that it was inherently connected to domestic developments where especially the
communist and socialist youth movements were heading the anti-fascist fight
against local far-right enemies.22
Communist anti-fascism in Sweden drew from examples of social-democratic
‘betrayal’ starting with the German November Revolution of 1918, and the sub-
sequent abandonment of socialist goals to preserve the capitalist Weimar Republic.
The Swedish communists directly addressed claims in the social democratic press
that the communists and fascists were comparable, and used the same methods
in their struggle to create the ‘bloody dictatorship of the few over the majority’.
On the contrary the Swedish communist A. J. Smålan argued in 1933 that through
debate and argument, they strove to win over the majority of the workers to the
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ which, Smålan spelt out, meant real democracy as it
represented the dictatorship of the great majority’s over the bourgeois minority.
Fascists, on the other hand, claimed that the masses had to be taught obedience and
that a small group of ‘expert’ leaders would rule over the masses.23 When the social
democrats claimed that ‘communism had been unable to hinder the fascist victory’,
Smålan retorted that the communists had never claimed to possess such a power.
The communists were trying to turn the tables and blamed the social democrats for
not using their power against the fascists, and for using it instead against the com-
munists, against those who had been most eager to take up the anti-fascist fight.
Perhaps the German communists could have gained the upper hand in 1933 in
select cities, but what would have followed when the army, the SA squadrons and
other fascist bands had attacked them? These uprisings would have drowned in
blood and resulted in an unimaginable terror against the workers.24 As long as the
government tolerated developments on the far right and actively fought against the
far left, the only remaining option was to form a united front of the workers from
below. This was deemed both necessary and possible for it was only 25 years ago
since they all had fought together as socialists, and it was the duty of the communists
to remind social-democratic workers of these shared values and histories.25
In Sweden, Rickard Lindström declared that bolshevism had played an impor-
tant role in paving the way for the far right. Communist ‘atrocity propaganda’ had
resulted in its ‘natural counterpart in the extreme parts of the bourgeoisie’. For
Lindström, the main lesson from Germany in 1933 was that only a working-class
movement that was ‘totally free’ from bolshevism could protect itself against
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fascism.26 With such statements in mind, the idea of anti-fascist united or popular
front alliances in Sweden could not be entertained. Arvid Wretling of the Swedish
communists underlined that they did not want unity at any price, nor a platonic
symbolic unity, but a ‘fighting united front’ of the working masses.27
In Sweden, like in the other Nordic countries, defence of democracy was one of
the most crucial questions related to anti-fascism. Was it the duty of the workers to
defend this flawed form of democracy? According to the communists, the current
system labelled democracy was in fact a ‘capitalist suppression technique’. Still it was
of outmost importance that the workers defended elements in the system that were
vital for them, such as the freedom of association, freedom of speech, a free press, the
right to strike, and the freedom to assembly. These were the valuable results of
decades of working-class struggle and had to be vigorously defended. Paradoxically,
those ‘screaming most loudly for the defence of democracy’ were the ones limiting
and circumscribing these very rights. ‘In the name of freedom and democracy
workers’ freedoms are banned and restricted’, Fritjof Lager complained as anti-fascist
efforts were being suppressed by the government.28 With the Swedish National
Socialist parties becoming ever more marginal after 1933, the social democrats and
the democratic bourgeoisie were congratulating themselves for overcoming the fas-
cist threat in Sweden, and started presenting themselves as ‘saviours’ of Sweden’s
freedom.29 However, as in Denmark, where the conservative youth movement had
been sympathetic to fascist ideas and practices, the same was said to be happening in
Sweden in the ‘Nationella Ungdomsförbundet’ (National Youth Association). More-
over, the creation and strengthening of the police, the bourgeois parties’ urge to put
down the trade unions and crush the communist movement, were seen as further
proof of a fascistisation of Swedish society. The communists therefore remarked that
the major threat in Sweden was not ‘open’ fascism, but fascism in patent leather
shoes and suits in the halls of government.30
Scandinavia and the European anti-fascist movement
After Hitler’s rise to power, one of the first initiatives of the international com-
munist trade union movement was to organise a ‘European Workers’ Congress
against Fascism’. It was first planned to take place in Prague, but due to pressure
from the Third Reich, the Czechoslovakian government banned the congress in
early April 1933.31 On an extremely short notice, and general confusion, it was
first re-located to Copenhagen for 14–17 April 1933, before it was finally held in
Paris on 5–6 June 1933. The confusion has even led historians to believe that no
anti-fascist conference was held in Copenhagen, and completely overlooked the
Scandinavian Anti-Fascist Conference. In spring 1933, Copenhagen had in fact
become a new global centre of the Comintern’s operations.32
Formerly top secret files in the Comintern archives reveal that the Comintern
apparatus was initially uncomfortable with the realisation that the Scandinavian
Anti-fascist Conference had a local Scandinavian origin. In March 1933 there were
two competing communist-led initiatives: on the one hand, there was the
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Amsterdam Anti-War movement which had been founded in August 1932. It had
resulted in the creation of broadly based anti-war committees on a global scale,
including the Scandinavian countries. These committees were set up under the
global network of the World Committee against the Imperialist War (in autumn
1933 renamed the World Commitee Against War and Fascism). Meanwhile, a
separate initiative for a workers’ anti-fascist congress and a European workers’ anti-
fascist movement was being led by the leadership of the Profintern (The Red
International of Labor Unions). Typically for the international communist move-
ment, a kind of turf war erupted between these two initiatives as the anti-war
committees started to engage in anti-fascism, whereas the anti-fascist initiative
strived to keep them separate. This became explicitly clear in the case of the
Scandinavian Anti-Fascist Conference. The Anti-War movement under Henri
Barbusse and Willi Münzenberg’s leadership was based in Paris, whereas the pre-
parations for the European Anti-Fascist Congress were co-ordinated from Copen-
hagen. The central liaison person in Copenhagen was Richard Gyptner, who from
1929 to February 1933 had functioned as secretary of the Comintern’s clandestine
Western European Bureau (WEB) in Berlin. From February to August 1933 he
functioned as the secretary of the ‘Organising bureau of the European Anti-Fascist
Congress’.33
These two communist-led initiatives were colliding as the anti-war committee
in Copenhagen had been planning a broad anti-war conference for Easter 1933,
but the Profintern’s workers’ anti-fascist conference was set for the same date in
Prague.34 In Gyptner’s secret report to Willi Münzenberg, sent on 3 April 1933, he
advised Münzenberg and the Paris anti-war committee to stand down in its efforts to
broaden the anti-fascist movement through the anti-war movement. This was,
according to Gyptner, totally contradictory to the line of the Comintern and
inhibited the development of the anti-fascist movement. An ‘Amsterdam type’ of
conference in Scandinavia was according to Gyptner out of the question. Events
seem to have escaped Gyptner’s hands as on 5 March 1933 the Norwegian anti-
war committee had suddenly, and allegedly without consulting either Copenhagen
or Stockholm, released an appeal for the organisation of a Scandinavian conference
against both war and fascism. Gyptner explained that the comrades in Norway had
misunderstood the Comintern’s line and believed mistakenly that the anti-war
committee would also take care of all anti-fascist work. However, the Norwegian
anti-war committee did not correct its line, but pushed their interpretation that
their ‘Amsterdam Committee would hold an Antifa-Conference’. The result was
major confusion in Scandinavia. Undoubtedly, this phase of disarray was not lim-
ited to the Scandinavian countries, but was more or less symptomatic for the global
movement as well.35 The Norwegian communists were reprimanded by the
Comintern for pursuing a ‘right-wing’ deviation as it had taken the initiative too
far when it on 11 March 1933 had reached out to the Norwegian social demo-
cratic party (DNA) to discuss the formation of a united front against fascism and
capitalist reaction. Despite this admonition, the Norwegian Communist Party
organised an anti-war meeting in Oslo on 12 March directed against fascism, which
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amplified the problem from the Comintern’s perspective.36 The situation would
last until August 1933, when the Comintern finally notified Henri Barbusse that
the anti-war and anti-fascist movements could be amalgamated. The Comintern
realised that the rank-and-file did not understand why there needed to be two
parallel organisations that separated the fight against fascism and war. Indeed, with
slogans such as ‘fascism means war’ the dualism had become acute.37
Before this change of line, Alfred Kurella, who was the head of the Comintern’s
Agitprop department, had directly instructed the anti-war committee in Copen-
hagen to convince the anti-war committees in Stockholm and Oslo to change the
Copenhagen meeting from an anti-fascist meeting into an anti-war conference.
Kurella even travelled to Stockholm to set the line straight, but as he arrived the
party newspapers had declared on their first pages that the Scandinavian conference
was an anti-fascist conference.38 As Barbusse was one the most prominent public
figures of the Amsterdam anti-war movement, his personal attendance at the anti-
fascist conference in Copenhagen thus signalled, some four months before the
Comintern’s revision of its position, that a merger of the anti-fascist movement and
the international anti-war movement was occurring.39
Representatives of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish CP Political Bureaus
were called to Copenhagen on 31 March 1933. Among those present was the
Norwegian representative Strand Johansen, the Secretary of the Norwegian Anti-
War Committee.40 He was singled out as the person responsible for starting the
whole debacle over the Scandinavian conference. Strand Johansen had studied at
the International Lenin School in Moscow from 1927 to 1930 and been thereafter
elected to the NKP’s central leadership. Later during the Nazi occupation of
Norway he would be arrested by the Gestapo and deported with his Russian wife
Helene Sterlina to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. His wife was executed
in Auschwitz while Strand Johansen himself survived and later became minister in
the Norwegian government in 1945.41
As a result of the meeting in Copenhagen, an official call for a Scandinavian
Anti-Fascist Conference was published. It was signed by the Copenhagen based
‘Kampfronten mod Fascismen’, the Stockholm-based ‘Antifascistiska Enhetskomi-
ten’, the central leadership of the Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (RGO)
in Norway, and ‘Finland’s antifascists’. It was declared that Hitler’s rise to power
and the brown terror in Germany had empowered the fascist tendencies in the
Nordic Countries. When explaining the urgency of the situation, the main focus
was not on the open (and indeed minuscule) fascist movements, but on the dangers
of fascistisation.42
The offensive of the Nordic fascists was to be met with a workers’ counter-
offensive. In stark contrast to the position of the social democratic mother party (to
pacify rather than challenge), the far right was now confronted with a radical
opponent ready to fight. Criticism was levelled at the Danish social democratic
ministers and party leaders in particular, who were actively forbidding the social
democratic workers from taking part in the anti-fascist movement and often dis-
rupted conference preparations. This was not coming from the social democratic
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workers, the anti-fascists declared: they could feel ‘the warm sympathy’ for the
anti-fascist cause that was emanating from working-class youths in Copenhagen
and Oslo especially. They therefore called out to all social democratic, com-
munist and unaffiliated workers, all working peasants and intellectuals to help
‘make Scandinavia a bulwark against fascism’. Moreover, they urged all to organise
meetings in trade unions, factories and mines, and all ships. The ongoing terror in
Germany held an important position in the Nordic deliberations, as all were called
to be active in solidarity campaigns with the German working class that was
‘standing in the midst of a heroic fight against fascist barbarism’.43
The Scandinavian Anti-Fascist Conference, 14–17 April 1933
Until recently, sources shedding light on the Scandinavian Anti-Fascist Conference,
organised over the Easter weekend, 14–17 April 1933, have been scarce. The fol-
lowing description is based on two new sources. The first is a 15-page surveillance
report by the German police. The second is a Danish conference report with
detailed transcripts of the event covering over 40 pages, held in the Comintern
archives, and previously untapped. On the basis of these two major sources we can,
for the first time, get an in-depth view of how fascism and anti-fascism were dis-
cussed in Scandinavia in the spring of 1933. How was the fascist threat defined and
what were perceived as the most effective ways to mobilise workers, intellectuals,
women and youths against fascist influences in Scandinavia?
According to the German police report, 348 men and 46 women participated in
the conference. It turned out to be a truly transnational affair with representatives
from ten countries, according to the following numbers: Denmark (218), Sweden
(120), Norway (29), Germany (11), Britain (4), Finland (2), Iceland (2), France (2),
Czechoslovakia (1), Indonesia (1), and 4 representatives from the ‘European
Committee’ whose nationalities are not mentioned. Politically we know that the
communists dominated with 228 delegates. They were followed by 139 persons
without party affiliation, 16 social democrats, 6 from the Nordic Workers Party
(Nord.Arb.Partei), 1 from the British Independent Labour Party (ILP), 1 from the
German Socialist Workers’ Party (SAP), 1 syndicalist, and 2 anarchists. The
majority defined themselves as workers (345 of 394), but the number of intellectuals
(41) was also significant.44
Aksel Larsen, the leader of the Danish CP and member of the Danish Parliament
since 1932, marked in one of his speeches how the Danish press (from right to left)
had sabotaged the conference by not printing a word about it. The entire press
corps had been there to meet Barbusse at the airport, but no one mentioned that
he was giving a speech in Copenhagen as a part of the Scandinavian Anti-fascist
Conference. According to Larsen, the Scandinavian press was only printing Gör-
ing’s official news bulletins, and ignoring the work of the anti-fascist committee. ‘If
we want to fight fascism,’ Larsen elaborated, ‘we cannot overlook how the social
democratic leaders in Germany let Nazism grow strong.’45 In Antifaschistische Front,
that functioned as the European anti-fascist congress’s newspaper, it was alleged
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that the Danish social democratic leadership had threatened anyone attending the
conference with expulsion from the party. Moreover the Social Democratic Party
leader and Danish Foreign Minister, Paul Munch, had allegedly dispatched letters
to all newspapers in Copenhagen with a governmental directive banning them
from publishing a single word about the fact that an anti-fascist conference was
taking place in Copenhagen. According to the Antifaschistische Front these actions
had confirmed and strengthened the conviction of those assembled that anti-fascism
would only be realised if taken on by the workers themselves.46
Larsen underlined in his speech that it was not enough to sign protest resolutions
against the terror in the Third Reich. They had to focus on the education of the
workers. According to Larsen the workers in the Scandinavian countries were not
yet conscious about the dangers of fascism. From Larsen’s viewpoint, the current
moment offered a unique chance to form the united front as the fight against fas-
cism had become the most important mission of the working class. Thanks to close
economic relations, geographic vicinity and similar languages (Swedish, Danish and
Norwegian) it was presented as especially important to form a common anti-fascist
centre in the Scandinavian countries. Moreover, the struggle was not supposed to
be directed only against fascism, but anti working-class measures connected to fas-
cism such as strike bans, demonstration bans, and all forms of capitalist exploitation.
Fascism was growing in the Scandinavian countries and it was their duty to fight it.
Larsen even envisioned that they could build Scandinavia into a pillar of the
international workers’ movement’s fight against fascism.47
Larsen himself was becoming a major thorn in the side of the Danish social
democratic coalition government that was trying to maintain a position of neu-
trality. One of Larsen’s more spectacular moves was made in August 1933 when
during a rally he symbolically tore a Nazi Swastika flag to pieces while declaring
it to be a ‘murder flag’. It caused a major uproar in the non-communist press
and the German government demanded that Larsen be set on trial for offending
the flag of a foreign nation. Larsen was eventually freed of all charges, but put
under strict surveillance so that he would not cause another major international
incident.48
When Henri Barbusse addressed the Scandinavian workers and intellectuals at
the congress in Copenhagen, he stressed that the time of passing resolutions was
over. Now was time for action. According to Barbusse, they needed to realise that
the current situation was no longer about a general crisis, but the collapse of a
whole system, and therefore he called for the united front of all workers, including
social democrats, communists, anarchists, and syndicalists. Significantly, Barbusse
explained to the Scandinavian public that they should not be misguided by the
German fascist example. Fascism could take different forms in different countries,
and for example in France, Barbusse claimed, fascism was taking on a more
‘democratic mask’.49 Larsen expressed in a similar vein that it was typical for
international fascism to appear with distinct national peculiarities. In Scandinavia
they were not going to get ‘fascism with swastikas’, just as in Italy, Germany and
other fascist countries, fascism appeared in different guises.50
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Among the Danish intellectuals at the conference was Professor Jørgen Jørgensen
from the University of Copenhagen. He argued that although the working class
formed the ultimate bulwark against fascism, the fight against fascism needed to
embrace all ‘freethinking people’. When looking at Nazi Germany, Jørgensen iden-
tified three issues that had to be condemned: Firstly, political violence against those of
anti-Nazi political opinion; secondly, the persecution of other races, especially the
Jews; and lastly, the nationalist delirium. Unlike many communist speakers, Jørgensen
asserted that there was no need to waste time on discussing who was to blame for the
rise of fascism. Nevertheless, he directed a warning to those democratic parties (i.e.
the social democrats) that had abstained from participating as they should be ready to
carry the responsibility for undermining the anti-fascist front. In his mind, all those
absent could not be described as ‘enablers’ of fascism. It seemed instead as if they had
been stricken with a blindness that hindered them from understanding the gravity of
the situation. Jørgensen’s appeal to broaden the working-class base of anti-fascism to
include the ‘intellectual workers’ was echoed in several other speeches.51
The famous Danish author Andersen Nexø also attended the Scandinavian Anti-
Fascist conference. He delivered a speech titled ‘Antifascism is Socialism’. He had recently
broken with the Social Democratic Party and wanted to show that he was not a man for
compromise. Nexø declared that in its very nature, the bourgeois part of humanity was
fascist. Fascism and the bourgeoisie were two descriptors for the same thing. The only
difference was that the bourgeoisie was using liberalism and democracy as camouflage
applied to its left side to fool the proletariat. Fascism was thus deemed a bourgeois world-
view that in effect represented ‘unmasked capitalism’. If you were against fascism, you
needed to be against capitalism and, ultimately, in favour of communism, Nexø elabo-
rated. Notably, both Jørgensen and Nexø belonged to the presidium of the Danish Anti-
War Committee formed in 1932. This illustrates further the early conflation of the
Scandinavian anti-war movement with the anti-fascist initiative.52
Among the international delegates attending the conference was the British repre-
sentative William Payne of the Independent Labour Party (ILP). He assured the con-
ference that despite the actions of the Labour Party against the united front, there was a
growing mass movement from below in favour of the united front in Britain.53 When
returning to Britain, Payne penned the pamphlet A London Busman Reports on the Fight
against Fascism, which was published by the ‘British Delegation Committee of the
European Workers’ Anti-Fascist Congress’. Payne declared that ‘the fascist danger is a
menace to the whole European working class’ and reproduced the fascism definition
used by Aksel Larsen which identified fascism as the mobilisation of ‘the most brutal
and reactionary forces in capitalist society’. Interestingly, Payne tried to address the fact
that although fascism was a brutal enemy operating ‘in the interest of the big capital,
the industrialists and the bankers’ the fascists in Germany had been particularly suc-
cessful in attracting working-class supporters (and therefore contrary to much
Comintern dogma). Payne articulated a classic socialist belief in ‘international working-
class solidarity’ and underlined that ‘liberal protest and declarations about democracy’
had no effect on stopping the fascist advance. The only thing that had enough power
to hinder the fascists was the collective power of a united working class.54
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Jeanette Olsen from Norway was another voice underlining the sorry state of
the international working class. For her, the social democrats, and the reformists in
the trade union movement, should be blamed. Olsen had been the secretary of the
Norwegian Communist Party’s women’s section, but had broken with the party in
1928. She had since remained active in the openly left-wing Clarté movement and
the revolutionary trade union organisations.55 Refreshingly, she urged all those
assembled in Copenhagen to reflect on their own part in the process. ‘Each and every
one of us has a larger or smaller responsibility for what was occurring’. They had all
committed mistakes along the road. As a long-time activist for women’s issues, Olsen
offered interesting perspectives on how the far right was overpowering them through
their focus on women and the youth. Hitler’s victory was based on their own
weaknesses and, according to Olsen, it was especially important for them to reflect on
how they could win over women to the fight against fascism. Olsen believed that
fascism had been victorious because it had been so successful in winning over work-
ing-class youth. She thus connected their poor work among women with the rise of
fascist youth movements for Olsen was convinced that youths were being influenced
by the women in their home environments. If the working-class women were
separated from the anti-fascist movement, it would have devastating effects in their
ability to reach the youth as well.56 Marie Nielsen from Bergen, Norway, confirmed
in her speech that they faced great challenges in their work among women. In
Norway fascism was, in Nielsen’s mind, using women through ‘masked’ women’s
associations, such as Hjemmets Vel (in 1933 re-named Norges Husmorforbund). Asmus-
sen of the Copenhagen’s Workers’ Defence Units also regretted in his statement that
not enough agitation had been made among women.57 As the attendance numbers
of the Scandinavian Conference illustrate, only 46 women were represented com-
pared to 348 men. There was obviously much to be done in winning over women to
anti-fascism not only in Scandinavia, but globally. Still, it must be highlighted that
several speakers at the congress were women, and they effectively elaborated on the
crucial nexus between fascism, the youth, women and the family.
Jeanette Olsen concluded that if they wanted to be successful in fighting fascism,
they needed to attack social democracy. Olsen assumed that as the Nordic social
democrats soon realised that the leaders of the German Social Democratic Party
were also falling victim to persecution in Germany, they would join them in the
anti-fascist fight. In the meantime Nordic social democrats might even join the
fascist side and pave the way for a fascist rule in Scandinavia as well. Olsen con-
cluded: ‘Our mission is therefore to lead a ruthless fight against Social Democracy
and the Trade Union Leadership.’58
Knut Senander, who led communists from the Gothenburg area of South Western
Sweden, elaborated in his conference speech how Hitler had actively used anti-
capitalist slogans to attract workers into the Nazi ranks.59 Senander was the author of
a booklet published in 1932 titled Nationalsocialismen – arbetarklassens dödsfiende
(National Socialism: The mortal enemy of the working class). Here we can trace the
intellectual basis of his anti-fascism. Senander argued that it was completely false to
characterise fascism as a ‘postwar phenomenon’. This was an all too easy and
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convenient explanation.60 This was the standard explanation used on the social
democratic side. In the major treatise on the dangers looming over democracy in
interwar Europe, the chief ideologue of the Danish Social Democratic movement,
Hartvig Frisch, in the monumental book Pest over Europa: Bolschevisme – Fascisme –
Nazisme, clearly stated that fascist agitation in all fascist countries had originated from
the fear of Bolshevism and from the real and presumed danger from the far left.61
Senander connected fascism instead to the bourgeois practice of working-class
oppression. In this respect, Mussolini had not created anything original, but was
simply following the lead of the Russian Tsar Nicolai II and the ‘black hundreds’ that
advocated reactionary, anti-revolutionary, and anti-Semitic violence in Russia during
and after the Russian Revolution of 1905. In Senander’s view, everywhere where
class conflict had reached such a critical level that the ruling class felt threatened and
insufficiently protected by conventional means, there was political space for fascism.62
When the Scandinavian Anti-Fascist Conference concluded, it passed a resolu-
tion to ‘the working people of Scandinavia’ and ‘all Scandinavian anti-fascists’. It
was the mission of the Scandinavian workers, just like it was the duty of the
working masses of the entire world, to expose the lies of the Hitler regime. The
unanimous conclusion of the conference was that the rise of fascism would never
have been possible if the working class had remained united.63
For Nordic anti-fascists, it was clear that anti-Semitism was being used by Hitler
as a tool to distract the workers from his attacks against the workers’ movement.
Nationalist furore was being used to divide the workers. Scandinavian anti-fascists
thus called for an even stronger worker unity between all peoples, and to raise the
proletarian banner of internationalism even higher. According to the resolution,
‘Hitler wanted to transform Germany to a workers’ penitentiary, to freedom’s
grave, to a fortress of murderous fascism.’ Scandinavian workers were called upon
to show their solidarity with their German ‘class brothers’, to strengthen their
common struggle, and to help them overcome Nazism. But as the means to help
those in Germany were limited, the focus was on Scandinavia and the slogan
crystallised to ‘Beat fascism, beat capitalism in your own country! Smother fascism
in the Scandinavian countries!’ Hitler’s rise to power thus triggered a direct rise in
anti-fascist activism in Scandinavia. Slogans were suggested for the upcoming May
1st demonstrations to be staged across Scandinavia: ‘Down with murder-fascism!’
but also ‘Bring forth the workers and peasants’ rule!’ At the same time, the objective
was already set for the next conference: a larger European Workers’ Anti-Fascist
Congress in Paris, and the sending of Scandinavian delegates.64
After the Paris congress, specific instructions guided anti-fascist work in Scandina-
via. An important focus was the boycott campaign of the harbour workers and seamen
directed against ships flying the swastika flag.65 But the removal of the swastika was not
limited to ships: anywhere, on buildings, posters, or newspapers, immediate action was
required: ‘No Swastika flag can be tolerated in Scandinavia (Intet Hagekorsflag maa taales
I Scandinavien).’Taking inspiration from elsewhere, the recent example by British anti-
fascists of chasing Hitler’s foreign policy expert Alfred Rosenberg out of the country
was to be followed with equal strength in Scandinavia.66
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When studying calls to action, it is always important to remember that these were
not automatically turned into actual practice. Anti-fascist responses in Scandinavia
were not always occasions of supreme anti-fascist consciousness. For example, in the
summer of 1933 members of the Swedish section of the International Workers’
Relief and the International Red Aid received a strongly worded reprimand for their
lack of action. A global solidarity week for the victims of Nazism had been
announced for 17–25 June 1933 but apparently it had passed unnoticed in
Sweden despite intensive propaganda efforts. Demonstrations had only taken place
in Stockholm and Kiruna, but in all other places ‘the class enemy and the fascist
butchers had applauded in malicious pleasure’. Despite elaborate published reports
on the crimes committed in Nazi Germany during 1933, a general ‘ghetto effect’
was becoming increasingly apparent. Nordic publications on the question of anti-
fascism and the relation to refugees and exiles arriving from Nazi Germany were
soon limited to left-wing audiences. The cultural battle in Denmark was directly
influenced by the government that demanded publishers and newspapers to take
into account the preservation of good relations to Germany. As Hans Hertel shows
in an elaborate analysis of the Danish literary and cultural scene, the official med-
dling into the tone of the publications soon became redundant as authors, editors,
publishers and theatre leaders started to implement self-censorship. As a result of the
polarisation, anti-fascism was equated with ‘cultural bolshevism’. Instead, in the
name of good political and cultural relations to Germany, ‘cultural neutralism’
became the norm. This provided space for ‘salon fascism’ and the spread of apolo-
getic and sympathetic views on Nazi Germany. If one wanted to read critical reports
on fascism and Nazism one needed to read the communist press and small left-wing
publishers, but as these publications were not accepted into general distribution
channels, their readership remained limited to certain circles of society.67
In the final analysis, Norway stands out in relation to Sweden, Denmark and
Finland. The initiative for the Scandinavian anti-fascist conference had originated
from the Norwegians; the Norwegian labour movement was characterised by a
stronger internationalism compared to the rest of Scandinavia.68 Halvdan Koht of
the Norwegian social democratic party (DNA) acted as Norwegian Foreign Min-
ister from March 1935 onwards and took a firm stance against German efforts to
hinder critical reporting in the Norwegian press. The German ambassador Heinrich
Rohland was so unsuccessful in influencing the DNA’s Arbeiderbladet that he was
called back to Berlin in 1936. His successor, Heinrich Sahm, had the worst start
imaginable as only two weeks after his arrival in Oslo, the Norwegian Nobel
Committee announced that the 1936 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Carl von
Ossietzky, the German socialist author and anti-fascist imprisoned in Nazi Ger-
many. The German government perceived the nomination as a hostile action by
the Norwegian government. The symbolical act of awarding the Peace Prize to
Ossietzky marked the darkest moment in Norwegian-German relations that they
would never recover from.69 Ossietzky’s Nobel Prize was perhaps one of the
symbolically most powerful anti-fascist actions against Germany made in the
Nordic Countries during the 1930s. Significantly, it was not hampered by the usual
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‘ghetto effect’ but noted widely on a global scale. Certainly, neither Denmark,
Sweden, Finland nor Iceland ever achieved such anti-fascist credentials. As the
German anti-fascist exile Kurt Rosenfeld tellingly noted in the USA, what had
particularly enraged Hitler and his followers was that this act of resistance had been
realised by their supreme ‘Aryan’ blood brothers, the Nordic master race.70
Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that even before 1933, anti-fascism had been a
vibrant part of the Scandinavian left, expressed in violent confrontations between
fascists and anti-fascists. The events of 1933 then created a unique moment that
invited engaging debate on the nature of democracy under pressure and the limits
and possibilities of united anti-fascist action. The Scandinavian Anti-Fascist con-
ference marked a historic highpoint in transnational anti-fascist activity within and
beyond Scandinavia. It was organised at a crucial juncture in the development of the
Comintern’s global anti-fascist position, and played an important role in uniting the
anti-war and anti-fascist causes. Anti-fascism invigorated transnational co-operation
within the Nordic Countries and constituted an often overlooked radical, opposi-
tional alternative to the hegemony of the centre-left alliances under social demo-
cratic leadership. It also led to bitter discussions on the origins of fascism and the role
of communists and social democrats as enablers of fascism. Since the governments of
Sweden and Denmark were strongly intertwined with social democracy in 1933, it
quickly revealed the price of neutrality in historically uncomfortable acts of appea-
sement and collaboration especially in the field of anti-communism and ‘anti-
anti-fascism’. The communists tried to invite the broader civil society to think more
openly about fascism as a political and societal phenomenon and warn against the
fascistisation of society. If Scandinavia was to be made a bulwark against fascism, they
needed to be vigilant and call out all fascist tendencies, sometimes at the cost of
blurring the lines between fascism and capitalism.
The case of Scandinavia finally illustrates the power of the Nazi foreign office
and how Nordic civil societies could be directly affected by Germany. Para-
doxically, anti-fascists were charged at home with meddling in German internal
affairs, while at the same time the German foreign office was permitted to interfere
in the civil societies of the smaller nations. It shows how international diplomacy
and transnational civil society activism were already deeply entwined, further
blurring the lines between national and international history, or fascism as a
domestic and international threat. In all too many cases the primacy of good for-
eign relations subdued the need to judge ‘internal’ German developments, and led
to the suppression and limitation of anti-fascist activism in the North.
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